We propose an extension of the asynchronous π -calculus in which a variety of security properties may be captured using types. These are an extension of the input/output types for the π-calculus in which I/O capabilities are assigned specific security levels. The main innovation is a uniform typing system that, by varying slightly the allowed set of types, captures different notions of security.
INTRODUCTION
The problem of protecting information and resources in systems with multiple sensitivity or security levels [Bell and LaPadula 1975] has been studied extensively. Flow analysis techniques have been used in Bodei et al. [1998 Bodei et al. [ , 1999 axiomatic logic in Reitmas and Andrews [1980] while in Smith and Volpano [1998] and Heintz and Riecke [1998] type systems have been developed for a number of prototypical programming languages. In this article, we explore the extent to which typing systems for ensuring various forms of security can also be developed for the asynchronous π -calculus [Boudol 1992; Honda and Tokoro 1992] . Specifically, we show that the standard typing system for the picalculus can be extended in a simple manner so as to address these issues. By varying the types used two quite separate security issues can be addressed: resource access control and information control. The former is described in terms of runtime errors; the latter in terms of noninterference [Smith and Volpano 1998; Focardi and Gorrieri 1997b] .
The (asynchronous) π-calculus is a very expressive language for describing distributed systems [Boudol 1992; Pierce and Turner 2000; Fournet et al. 1996] in which processes intercommunicate using channels. Thus, n?(x)P is a process which receives some value on the channel named n, binds it to the variable x and executes the code P . Corresponding to this input command is the asynchronous output command n! v which outputs the value v on n. The set of values which may be transmitted on channels includes channel names themselves; this, together with the ability to dynamically create new channel names, gives the language its descriptive power.
Within the setting of the π -calculus, we wish to investigate the use of types to enforce security policies. To facilitate the discussion we extend the syntax with a new construct to represent a process running at a given security clearance, σ [[ P ] ]. Here σ is some security level taken from a complete lattice of security levels SL and P is the code of the process. Further, we associate with each channel, the resources in our language, a set of input/output capabilities [Pierce and Sangiorgi 1996; Hennessy and Riely 2002] , each decorated with a specific security level. Intuitively, if channel n has a read capability at level σ , then only processes running at security level σ or higher may be read from n. This leads to the notion of a security policy , which associates a set of capabilities with each channel in the system. The question then is to design a typing system which ensures that processes do not violate the given security policy.
Of course, this depends on when we consider such a violation to take place. For example, if assigns the channel or resource n the highest security level top, then it is reasonable to say that a violation will eventually occur in c! n | bot [[c?(x) x?( y) P ]]
• M. Hennessy and J. Riely as after the communication on c, a low level process, bot [[n?( y) P ]] has gained access to the high-level resource n. Underlying this example is the principle that processes at a given security level σ should have access to resources at security level at most σ . We formalize this principle in terms of a relation P −→ err, indicating that P violates the security policy .
To prevent such errors, we restrict attention to security policies that are somehow consistent. Let be such a consistent policy; consistency is defined by restricting types so that they respect a subtyping relation. We then introduce a typing system, P , which ensures that P can never violate :
If P , then for every context C [ ] such that C [P ] and every Q that occurs during the execution of C [P ] , that is, C [P ] → * Q, we have Q −→ / err. Thus, our typing system ensures that low-level processes will never gain access to high-level resources. The typing system implements a particular view of security, which we refer to as the R-security policy, as it offers protection to resources. Here communication is allowed between high-level and low-level principals, provided, of course, that the values involved are at the appropriate security level.
This policy does not rule out the possibility of information leaking indirectly from high-security to low-security principals. Suppose h is a high channel and hl is a channel with high-level write access and low-level read access in:
top [[h?(x) This system can be well typed although there is some implicit information flow from the high-security agent to the low-security one; the value received on the high-level channel h can be determined by the low-level process Q.
It is difficult to formalize exactly what is meant by implicit information flow and in the literature various authors have instead relied on noninterference [Goguen and Meseguer 1992; Roscoe et al. 1994; Focardi and Gorrieri 1997b; Ryan and Schneider 1997] , a concept more amenable to formalization, which ensures, at least informally, the absence of implicit information flow.
To obtain such results for the π -calculus, we need, as the above example shows, a stricter security policy, which we refer to as the I-security policy. This allows a high-level principal to read from low-level resources but not to write to them. Using the terminology of Bell and LaPadula [1975] and Denning [1977] : -write up: A process at level σ may only write to channels at level σ or above -read down: A process at level σ may only read from channels at level σ or below.
In fact, the type-checking system remains the same and we only need constrain the notion of type. In this restricted type system well typing, P , ensures a form of noninterference.
To formalize this noninterference result, we need to develop a notion of process behaviour, relative to a given security level. Since the behavior of processes also depends on the type environment in which they operate, we need to define a relation P ≈ σ Q that intuitively states that, relative to , there is no observable distinction between the behavior of P and Q at security level σ ; processes running at security level σ can observe no difference in the behavior of P and Q. Lack of information flow from high-to low-security levels now means that this relation is invariant under changes in high-level values; or indeed under changes in high-level behavior. It turns out that the extent to which this is true depends on the exact formulation of the behavioral equivalence ≈ σ . We show that it is not true if ≈ σ is based on observational equivalence [Milner 1993] or must testing equivalence [De Nicola and Hennessy 1984] . But a result can be established if we restrict our attention to may testing equivalence (here written σ ). Specifically, we will show that, for certain H, K :
High-level behavior can be arbitrarily changed without affecting low-level equivalences. This is the main result of the article. The remainder of the article is organized as follows: In the next section, we define the security π-calculus, giving a labeled transition semantics and a formal definition of runtime errors. In Section 3, we design a set of types and a typing system that implements the resource control policy. The types are an extension of the IO-types for the π -calculus from Pierce and Sangiorgi [1996] and Hennessy and Riely [2002] in which security levels are associated with specific capabilities. This section also contains Subject Reduction and Type Safety theorems. In Section 4, we motivate the restrictions required on types and terms in order to implement the information control policy. We also give a precise statement of our noninterference result, and give counter-examples to related conjectures based on equivalences other than may testing. The proof of our main theorem depends on an analysis of may testing in terms of asynchronous sequences of actions [Castellani and Hennessy 1998 ], which, in turn, depends on detailed operational semantics for our language, where actions are paramterized relative to a typing environment. This is the topic of Section 5, which also contains the proof of our main theorem.
THE LANGUAGE
The syntax of the security π-calculus, given in Figure 1 , uses a predefined set of names, ranged over by a, b, . . . , n and a set of variables, ranged over by x, y, z. Identifiers are either variables or names. Security annotations, ranged over by small Greek letters σ, ρ, . . . , are taken from a complete lattice SL, , , , top, bot of security levels. We also assume for each σ a set of base values BV σ , ranged over by bv. We require that all syntactic sets be disjoint. The input construct "u?(X : A) P " binds all variables in the pattern X while the construct "(new a : A) P " binds the name a. We have the usual notions of free and bound names and variables, α-equivalence and substitution. We identify terms up to α-equivalence. Let fn(P ) and fv(P ) denote the set of free names and variables, respectively, of the term P . We use "P {|v/ X |}" to denote the substitution of the identifiers occurring in the value v for the variables occurring in the pattern X . For "P {|v/ X |}" to be well-defined, X and v must have the same structure; to avoid unnecessary complications, we assume that a variable can occur at most once in a pattern. The binding constructs have types associated with them; these will be explained in Section 3, but are ignored for the moment. In general, these types (and the various security annotations) will be omitted from terms unless they are relevant to the discussion at hand.
The behavior of a process is determined by the interactions in which it can engage. To define these, we give a labeled transition semantics (LTS) for the language. The set Act of labels, or actions, is defined as follows:
Input of v on a learning private namesc (c :C)a!v Output of v on a revealing private namesc.
In both the input and output actions, we require thatc be in fn(v). Let VAct = Act\{τ } be the set of the visible actions, either input or output, ranged over by α, β. Whenever these are used, we assume that the bound namesc occur in the value v. Formally, the bound names of an action are defined by bn(τ ) = ∅ and bn((c :C)a!v) = bn((c :C)a?v) = {c}. We also use E(α) to denote the bound names in α, together with their types: E((c :C)a!v) = E((c :C)a?v) = (c :C). Further, let n(µ) be the set of names occurring in µ, whether free or bound. We say that the actions "(c :C)a?v" and "(c :C)a!v" are complementary. Given a visible action α, we writeᾱ to indicate the action complementary to α; note that bn(α) = bn(ᾱ) and
The LTS is defined in Figure 2 and, for the most part, the rules are straightforward; it is based on the standard operational semantics from Milner et al. [1993] to which the reader is referred for more motivation. Note that in the input rule (L-IN) we are assuming the action (c :C)a?v is well-defined; in principle, the process a?(X )P can input any value v, but, for the action to be valid, the bound namesc must appear in v and moreover must be new to the process.
Informally a security policy associates with each channel a security level. Our approach, slightly more general, is to incorporate this information into the standard notion of channel types for the π -calculus [Pierce and Sangiorgi 1996; Hennessy and Riely 2002] , designed to rule out run-time mistypings, such as sending a triple on a channel designed for pairs. In particular, we associate security levels with capabilities on channels, rather than channels themselves, although indirectly we are able to associate security levels with channels. To this end, precapabilities and pretypes are defined as follows: 
We tend to abbreviate a singleton set of capabilities, {cap}, as cap.
A security policy, , is a finite mapping from names to pretypes. Thus, for example, if maps the channel lh to the pretype {w bot B , r top A }, for some appropriate A, B, then low-level processes may write to lh, but only high-level ones may read from it; this is an approximation of the security associated with a mailbox. On the other hand, if maps hl to {w top B , r bot A }, then hl acts more like an information channel; anybody can read from it, but only highlevel processes may place information there.
• M. Hennessy and J. Riely The import of a security policy may be underlined by defining what it means to violate it. Our definition is given in Figure 3 , in terms of a relation P −→ err. As an example of runtime errors, we have that ρ [[a! v P ] has the right to write on the channel lh. -If assigns to the channel c a pretype that includes a capability of the form r top C , then, a priori, there is no type error in the expression c! lh , although intuitively it involves a security leak; a low-security agent can read from c a channel that has at least some capability that should only be accessible to high-security principals. However, it is straightforward to place it in a context in which a security leak occurs:
. Thus, our typing system will also be required to rule out such processes.
RESOURCE CONTROL
Our typing system will apply only to certain security policies, those in which the pretypes are in some sense consistent. Consistency is imposed using a system of kinds: the kind RType σ comprises the value types accessible to processes at security level σ . These kinds are, in turn, defined using a subtyping relation on precapabilities and pretypes.
Definition 3.1 Let <: be the least preorder on precapabilities and pretypes such that:
For each ρ, let RType ρ be the least set that satisfies:
Let RType be the union of the kinds RType ρ over all ρ. Note that, if σ ρ, then RType σ ⊆ RType ρ . Intuitively, low-level values are accessible to high-level processes. However, obviously, the converse is not true. For example, w top ∈ RType top , but w top is not in RType bot . Note also that there is no relation between subtyping and accessibility at a given security level. For example:
The compatibility requirement between read and write capabilities in a type (RT-WRRD), in addition to the typing implications discussed in Hennessy and Riely [2002] , also has security implications. For example, suppose r bot B σ and w top B are capabilities in a valid channel type, for some type B. Then, a priori, a high-level process can write to the channel while a low-level process may read from it. However, the only possibility for σ is bot, that is, only low-level values may be read. Moreover, the requirement B <: B σ implies that B must also be B bot . So although high-level processes may write to the channel they may only write low-level values. on types. Typical clauses are
One can then show, by induction on the definitions, that:
A ∈ RType ρ and A ∈ RType ρ implies A B ∈ RType ρ ρ and A B ∈ RType ρ ρ .
Finally, it is straightforward to show that and , defined in this manner, are indeed partial meet and partial join operators.
We now discuss the typing system, which is defined using restricted security policies, called type environments. A type environment is a finite mapping from identifiers (names and variables) to types. We adopt some standard notation. For example, let " , u : A" denote the obvious extension of ; " , u : A" is only defined if u is not in the domain of . The subtyping relation <:, together with the partial operators and , may also be extended to environments. For example, <: if for all u in the domain of , (u) <: (u). The partial meet enables us to define more subtle extensions. For example, {u : A} may be defined even if u is already in the domain of . It is well defined when (u) A exists; in which case, it maps u to this type. We normally abbreviate the simple environment {u : A} to u : A and moreover use v : A to denote its obvious generalization to values; this is only well defined when the value v has the same structure as the type A.
The typing system is given in Figure 4 where the judgments are of the form " σ P ". If σ P , we say that P is a σ -level process. Also, let " P " abbreviate " top P ". Intuitively " σ P " indicates that the process P will not cause any security errors if executed with security clearance σ . The rules are very similar to those used in papers such as Pierce and Sangiorgi [1996] and Hennessy and Riely [2002] for the standard I/O typing of the π -calculus. The rule (T-EQ), a nonstandard rule for matching, is taken from Hennessy and Riely [2002] , where it is explained and motivated. Essentially it allows processes to accumulate type information on names, information which might be received piecemeal on different occurrences of the same name. It is shown to be particularly useful in types systems, such as ours, in which types are viewed as capabilities.
The only significant use of the security levels is in the (T-IN) and (T-OUT) rules, where the channels are required to have a specific security level. This is inferred using auxiliary value judgments, of the form v : A. It is interesting to note that security levels play no direct role in their derivation. One might expect that the judgments for values would need to ensure that a value written to a channel be accessible at the appropriate security level. This job, however, is already handled by our definition of types. For example, in order for w σ A to be a type, A must be a type accessible to σ .
The typing system enjoys many expected properties, the proof of which we leave to the reader. PROPOSITION 3.3.
- (SPECIALIZATION) v : A and A <:
The main technical tool required for Subject Reduction is, as usual, a substitution result. We consider one example of the rule (L-CTXT):
LEMMA 3.4 (SUBSTITUTION).
The precise details depend on µ, but in each of the three possibilities the reasoning is very similar; so suppose µ is an input action (c :C)a?v. We know, 
Without loss of generality, we may assume α is the input action (c :C)a?v. We know σ P, Q and therefore we may apply induction to both reduction statements. Applying it to Qᾱ −→ Q we obtain ,c :C v : A and ,c :C σ Q. The former implies that v : A is well defined and therefore induction applied to P α −→ P gives v : A σ P . Since ,c :C v : A, it follows that ,c :C <:
v : A and therefore, by Weakening we have ,c :C σ P . An application of (T-STR), followed by (T-NEW), gives the required
Remark. Most of the restrictions imposed on types are essential to achieving Subject Reduction, but a few are not. First, the Subject Reduction theorem remains true if we weaken (U-WR) to:
A and σ ρ, and the proof remains the same. Were we to adopt this rule, it would be true that every process typable at level σ would also be typable at level ρ, for σ ρ. Given our actual definition, this is not true. Nonetheless, every process typable at σ can be trivially rewritten so that it is typable at ρ given our definition (one must simply surround output actions with explicit security restrictions). We have adopted the stronger rule because it is necessary in the next section and results in no substantive loss of expressivity. Note also that with our more restrictive defintion of type the statement of the output clause of Subject Reduction can be strengthened; because of the restriction the only possible value of δ is σ . However, the clause as it stands remains true with the weakened version of (U-WR).
Second, we have limited types to contain at most one read and one write capability. We have done so to simplify the proofs, particularly in the next section. This clearly results in a loss of expressiveness. We have yet to find, however, a compelling example that requires a resource to have more than one read or one write capability. It is usually sensible to simply take the meet.
We can now prove the first main result: THEOREM 3.6 (TYPE SAFETY We end this section with a brief discussion on the use of the syntax σ [[ P ]] in our language. We have primarily introduced it in order to discuss typing issues. Having defined our typing system, we may now view σ [[ P ]] simply as notation for the fact that, relative to the current typing environment , the process P is welltyped at level σ , that is, σ P . Technically, we can view σ [[ P ]] to be structurally equivalent to P , assuming we are working in an environment such that σ P . This will be formalized in Section 5.
INFORMATION FLOW
We have shown in the previous sections that, in well-typed systems, processes running at a given security level can only access resources appropriate to that level. However, as pointed out in the Introduction, this does not rule out (implicit) information flow between levels. Consider the following system
executing in an environment in which h is a top-level read/write channel and hl is a top-level write and bot-level read channel. This system can be welltyped, using R-types, so the processes only access resources appropriate to their security level. Nevertheless there is some implicit flow of information from top to bot; the low-level process, bot [[hl?(z) Q]], by testing the value received on z can gain some information about the high-level value x received by the high-level process on the high-level channel h. One way of formalizing this notion of flow of information is to consider the behavior of processes and how it can be influenced. If the behavior of lowlevel processes is independent of any high-level values in its environment, then we can say that there can be no implicit flow of information from high level to low level. This is not the case in the example above. Suppose, for example, that Q is the code fragment "if z = 0 then l 1 ! else l 2 ! ". If This is not surprising in view of the type associated with the channel hl; in the terminology of Bell and LaPadula [1975] , it allows a write down from a high-level process to a low-level process. Thus, if we are to eliminate implicit information flow between levels in well-typed processes, we need to restrict further the allowed types; types such as {w top , r bot } clearly contradict the spirit of secrecy. Thus, for the rest of the article we work with the more restrictive set IType, the Information types. In order for {w σ A , r σ A } to be in IType, it must be that σ σ ; this is not necessarily true for types in RType.
Definition 4.1. For each ρ, let IType ρ , be the least set that satisfies the rules in Definition 3.1, with (RT-WRRD) replaced by:
IType be the union of IType ρ over all ρ. We write σ P if σ P can be derived from the rules of Figure 4 using these more restrictive types.
All of the results of the previous section carry over to the stronger typing system; we leave their elaboration to the reader.
Unfortunately, due to the expressiveness of our language, the use of I-types still does not preclude information flow downwards, between levels. Consider the system
executing in an environment in which h is a top-level read/write channel and l is a bot-level read/write channel. This system can be well typed using I-types, but there still appears to be some some implicit flow of information from top to bot. The problem here is that our syntax allows a high-level process, which can not write to low-level channels, to evolve into a low-level process which does have this capability; we need to place a boundary between low-and high-level processes that ensures a high-level process never gains write access to low-level channels. This is the aim of the following definition: Definition 4.2 Define the security levels of a term below ρ, slρ(P), as follows:
A process P is σ -free if for every ρ in sl top (P ), ρ σ .
Note that top ∈ sl top (P ) for every P and therefore, if P is σ -free, it must be that σ = top.
In general σ -freedom restricts the ability of processes to reduce their security level to σ ; this will restrict their ability to write to σ -level processes, but not their ability to read from them. The definition may appear complicated, but, unfortunately, it is not sufficient to disallow occurrences of σ To what extent, therefore, does σ -freedom preclude implicit information flow? We avoid giving a formal definition of implicit information flow. Instead, we can demand that, in order to informally preclude such information flow, low-level behavior be completely independent of arbitrary high-level behavior; it should not be possible to influence low-level behaviour by changing high-level behavior. This can be formalized as a noninterference result of the form:
Suppose P and Q are σ -level processes and P ≈ σ Q. Further suppose that H and K are arbitrary top-level σ -free processes. Then,
Here ≈ σ is some form of behavioral equivalence that is sensitive only to behavior of processes that are σ -level or lower. It turns out that such a result is very dependent on the exact formulation used, as the following example illustrates.
Let A denote the type {w bot , r bot } and B denote {r bot }. Further, let map a and b to A and B, respectively, and n to the type {w bot A , r bot A }. Now consider the terms P and H defined by
It is very easy to check that P, H and that H is bot-free. Note that, in the term P | H, there is contention between the low-and high-level processes for who will receive a value on the channel n. This means that, if we were to base the semantic relation ≈ on any of strong bisimulation equivalence, weak bisimulation equivalence [Milner 1989 ] or must testing [De Nicola and Hennessy 1984] , we would have
The essential reason is that the consumption of writes can be detected; the reduction 
Then, P | H | T may eventually produce an output on ω whereas P | 0 | T cannot. However, since our language is asynchronous, such tests are not allowed.
In the following section, we prove a noninterference result using may testing on processes typable using I-types. Note that, as indicated by the examples above, we can rewrite our informal notion of noninterference in an equivalent, but simpler manner. It is sufficient to insist that P | H ≈ σ P for all σ -level processes P and top-level σ -free processes H. This is the formulation used in Focardi and Gorrieri [1995] , and if the equivalence ≈ σ enjoys reasonable properties this is sufficient to ensure
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for all top-level σ -free processes H, K . Indeed, our proof will proceed in this manner.
NONINTERFERENCE UP TO MAY TESTING
May equivalence is defined in terms of tests. A test is a process with an occurrence of a new reserved resource name ω. We use T to range over tests, with the typing rule σ ω! for all and σ . When placed in parallel with a process P , a test may interact with P , producing an output on ω if some desired behavior of P has been observed.
We wish to capture the behavior of processes at a given level of security. Consequently, we only compare their ability to pass tests that are well-typed at that level. The definition must also take into account the environment in which the processes are used, as this determines the security level associated with resources.
Definition 5.2 We write P σ Q if for every test T such that σ T :
Note that in the definition of "P σ Q", P and Q need not be well-typed. is a constraint on the environment in which the processes are run, not on the processes themselves. Nevertheless, at least in this article, the definition will only be applied to processes that are well behaved with respect to the constraint .
We can now state the main result of the article.
THEOREM 5.3 (NONINTERFERENCE). If σ P, Q and top H, K where H and K are σ -free processes, then P
As already indicated, this theorem will follow if we can establish that
for all P, H satisfying the constraints of the theorem. The proof of this fact relies on constructing sufficient conditions to guarantee that two processes are may equivalent. This is the topic of the next section, which is followed by a section giving the proof of the noninterference result.
Sufficient Conditions
The purpose of the LTS semantics given in Figure 5 is to capture the possible interactions in which a process can engage with its environment. However, our language is typed and therefore the type environment, constraining the environment, may forbid interactions which the process, in principle, is capable of performing. For example, if is an environment that associates with the channel a only a read capability, then we will have the identity a?(X ) P σ 0 because there can be no test T such that σ T , which can interact with a?(X ) P to discover its behavior.
In other words, we need to modify the LTS semantics to take into account the environment in which the process is being tested. This leads us to judgments of the form P µ −→ σ P . Intuitively, this should be read:
Let T be a test such that σ T . Then P can interact with T by performing the action µ and evolving to P . As a result of this interaction, the capabilities of the context may be increased, as reflected in .
The modified LTS is defined in Figure 5 and the rules are straightforward. However, note that, in the rule (C-OUT), it should be informally understood that the environment already knows the value v being output; it is only in the rule (C-OPEN) where the environment learns new information.
Some properties of this modified LTS are easy to establish. For example, in P µ −→ σ P the new environment is completely determined by and the action µ. If µ is τ , then coincides with ; otherwise, it is augmented with the type environment E(µ), the bound names together with their declared types. For this reason, the following lemma is easily established:
LEMMA 5.4. P µ −→ σ P and P implies P .
PROOF. By induction on the derivation of the judgement P µ −→ σ P .
• M. Hennessy and J. Riely There are also very simple conditions that ensure that a priori untyped actions may be performed in a type environment: Note that, in this lemma, the requirement P is essential to ensure that, if T receives a value v, then that value is compatible with the type environment .
May testing is determined by the traces, s, t, in VAct * which processes can perform. Let represent the empty trace. The notion of complementary actions lifts element-wise to traces,s. The names in a trace n(s) is defined as the union of the names in the individual actions; likewise the bound names in a trace bn(s) is defined as the union of the bound names in the individual actions.
Definition 5.7 (Traces). Let P s =⇒ σ P be the least relation such that:
We can generalize the function E from actions to sequences by: In general, the converse to this result is not true; the behavior of a process P is not determined by the set of sequences s such that P s =⇒ σ . For example, if allows the value v to be sent and received on channel a at level σ , then
Note that E(s) = E(s). This notation enables us to generalize the
Our language is asynchronous and therefore, as in [Honda and Tokoro [1992] and Castellani and Hennessy [1998] , we need to consider the asynchronous actions of processes.
Definition 5.9 (Asynchronous Traces). Let P s =⇒ a σ Q be the least relation which, in addition to the clauses in Definition 5.7, satisfies
Again we use P
The ability to compose asynchronous traces depends on the fact that our language is asynchronous. To state the required compositional property, we need a structural equivalence on processes. This is least equivalence preserved by the static operators, σ [[ ]], | and (new a), generated by the following equations, where for convenience the types of bound variables are omitted.
The first three equations allow us to manipulate the typing annotations σ [[ ]], as discussed briefly at the end of Section 3; the remainder are familiar from Milner et al. [1993] . We leave to the reader the rather tedious chore of proving that this equivalence is preserved under reductions:
LEMMA 5.10. If P ≡ Q and P µ −→ P , then there exists some Q ≡ P such that Q µ −→ Q .
LEMMA 5.11 (ASYNCHRONOUS ACTIONS). If σ T and T
(c :C)a!v −→ T then T ≡ (newc :C) (δ[[a! v ]] | T ), for some δ σ .
PROOF. By induction on the derivation of T
(c :C)a!v −→ T . We give two examples.
and the result follows.
σ ρ P and so by induction
for some δ σ ρ. Using the rules (S-SRNEW) (S-SRSR) and (S-SRPAR) we can (new E(s )) (P | T ). We also have, by the rule (L-COM), P | T τ −→ (newc :C) (P | T ). By combining these we may easily obtain a required reduction
a : w δ B and ,c :C v : B. Again, we can apply induction to obtain a derivation (P | δ[[a! v ] 
(new E(s )) (P | T ). and therefore
However, we can we apply the previous lemma to the derivation Tᾱ −→ T to obtain the fact that T ≡ (newc :C) (δ [[a! v ] ] | T ). Moreover, since the namesc are new to P , we have
These two results immediately give us a sufficient condition for two processes to be semantically equivalent. 
Proof of the Main Result
The proof of the noninterference result will now depend on comparing the traces of the processes P and P | H. First, we must show some properties of σ -free processes. We now show that, in appropriate environments, σ -free processes can never perform σ -level write actions. Unfortunately, the proof, which is inductive, requires a slight generalization of the notion of σ -freedom.
Definition 5.16. We say P is σ -free relative to δ if ρ σ for every ρ in sl δ (P ).
Note that, if P is σ -free relative to δ, then, since δ ∈ sl δ (P ), we know that δ σ . Also, P being σ -free relative to top means precisely that P is σ -free. a : w δ B and by the fact that (a) must be a well-defined type δ ρ . Since δ σ , it follows that ρ σ .
Here, we need to apply induction.
Note that sl δ (P ) = { δ} ∪ sl δ (Q) and, therefore, Q is σ -free relative to δ. Moreover, δ P implies δ Q and, therefore, induction can be applied to obtain the required ρ σ .
The main technical result required for noninterference is given in the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 5.18. Suppose σ P and top H, where H is σ -free. Then
PROOF. The proof is by induction on the derivation of
We examine the most interesting cases.
The most important case here is when there is communication between P and H. Here, P -Output from H to P . We show that this case is not possible as it would involve a write down. Here, α would have the form (c :C) a?v and applying Subject Reduction to both σ P and top H we would obtain both a : r σ A and a : w top B . Since is a well-defined type, this would imply top σ , which contradicts the fact that H is σ -free. 
where α is an output action (c :C) a!v. Here, Lemma 5.17 implies that H can not be responsible for the action; it must be P , and again a simple inductive argument suffices.
-s has the form α.s , where α is an input action (c :C) a?v, and ,c :
a : w δ B and ,c :C v : B. Since ,c :C σ (P | a! v ), we may apply induction to obtain ,c :C 
PROOF. To establish the result, as has already been explained, it is sufficient to show that P σ P | H. ; this follows from the previous proposition. Note that the requirement that P, Q be well-typed processes at level σ is necessary for this result to be true. For example, consider the process P defined by h?(x) l ? y.0 in an environment in which h, l are high-level and low-level resources, respectively. Then, P bot 0. However, P | H / bot H, where H is the high-level process h! .
CONCLUSIONS AND RELATED WORK
In this article, we have proposed a simple typing system for enforcing a variety of security properties for the security π-calculus. The types are obtained by adding security levels to the standard input/output types of the π -calculus [Pierce and Sangiorgi 1996; Hennessy and Riely 2002] . The main novelty is a uniform typing system, a simple extension to that in Pierce and Sangiorgi [1996] which can handle two disparate security issues, by a minor variation in the set of types. The first set, called R-Types, is designed with resource access control in mind; the security level of a resource (or more formally a capability on a resource) dictates the security clearance required by any process seeking to access that resource. In future work, we hope to extend these types for use in distributed systems [Riely and Hennessy 1999] . The second set, the more restricted I-types, controls the (implicit) flow of information from high-to lowsecurity levels; this is formalized via a noninterference result for may testing equivalence over our security π-calculus.
There is considerable tension between the expressiveness of the language under investigation, the restrictiveness of the type system and the strength of the noninterference result possible. The π -calculus is very expressive and, consequently, there are many different ways in which a context may discern a difference in process behaviors. For example, as we have seen, the context can test if a process has the ability (or not) to rendez-vous on a specific channel. These types of distinguishing contexts are not available in sequential languages, such as those studied in Volpano et al. [1996] and Boudol and Castellani [2001] . Consequently, to ensure noninterference, type systems for the π -calculus have to be much more restrictive than for sequential or simple multithreaded languages. Our type system establishes noninterference with respect to a relatively weak equivalence, may testing. Stronger results, in the sense of noninterference with respect to more discriminating equivalences such as must testing or observational equivalence, might be obtained by restricting further the ability to be well typed. For example, we could introduce types that ensure that there is no contention between high-level and low-level processes over read access to channels or types that ensure that, when a highlevel process reads a value from a low-level channel, it immediately restores it. This line of research has been pursued further in Honda et al. [2000] , where, at the expense of extending considerably the syntax of the π-calculus, they have introduced a much more sophisticated type system, which includes, linear, receptive types and adaptations of the behavior types from Yoshida [1996] . They hope to establish noninterference theorems with respect to some notion of bisimulation equivalence (which is much stronger than testing) but the precise details have yet to be published. Nevertheless, there is a danger in this approach. As the sophistication of the type system increases, not only do type checking and type inference become more complicated, there is also the likelihood that much of the expressive power of the underlying language is lost.
An alternative (and much more established) approach, Volpano et al. [1996] starts with a much less expressive language (essentially a sequential language of while programs) and, by using a relatively weak type system, obtains a relatively strong noninterference result-at least as formulated in Boudol and Castellani [2001] . But as the expressiveness of the language is increased [Smith and Volpano [1998] and Boudol and Castellani 2001] , the restricting power of the type system must, in turn, be increased, to rule out more potentially interfering behaviors, and, in turn, the noninterference results can only be obtained with respect to weaker equivalences. At this point, it is fair to say that the relative importance of the parameters -expressiveness of the language -expressiveness of the type system -strength of equivalence used in noninterference remains to be elucidated. But we believe that the security π-calculus is an excellent vehicle in which such questions can be explored.
Methods for controling information flow are a central research issue in computer security [Denning 1977; Goguen and Meseguer 1992; Smith and Volpano 1998 ], and in the Introduction, we have indicated a number of different approaches to its formalization. Noninterference has emerged as a useful concept and is widely used to infer (indirectly) the absence of information flow. In publications such as Roscoe et al. [1994] and Focardi and Gorrieri [1995] , it has been pointed out that process algebras may be fruitfully used to formalize and investigate this concept; for example, in Focardi et al. [1997] , process-algebra-based methods are suggested for investigating security protocols, essentially using a formalization of noninterference for CCS.
However, in these publications, the noninterference is always defined behaviorally, as a condition on the possible traces of CCS or CSP processes; useful surveys of trace-based noninterference may be found in Focardi and Gorrieri [1995] and Ryan and Schneider [1997] . Here, we work with the more expressive π -calculus, which allows dynamic process creation and network reconfiguration. Our approach to noninterference is also more extensional in that it is expressed in terms of how processes effect their environments, relative to a particular behavioral equivalence. However, the proof of our main result, Theorem 5.3, describes may equivalence in terms of (typed) traces; presumably, a trace based definition of noninterference, similar in style to those in Focardi and Gorrieri [1995] and Ryan and Schneider [1997] could be extracted from this proof.
More importantly, our approach differs from much of the recent processcalculus-based security research in that we develop purely static methods for ensuring security. Processes are shown to be secure not by demonstrating some property of trace sets, using a tool as such as that in Focardi and Gorrieri [1997a] , but by type-checking. The long-term hope is that type systems such as these will be incorporated into security-aware programming languages. Thus, users working at a given security level would automatically have their applications type-checked at that level; moreover, the variety of types used, for example, R-types versus I-types, could vary according to the particular application.
Types have also been used in this manner in Abadi [1997] , for an extension of the π -calculus called the spi-calculus. But there, the structure of the types are very straightforward; the type Secret representing a secret channel, the type Public representing a public one, and Any which could be either. However, the main interest is in the type rules for the encryption/decryption primitives of the spi-calculus. The noninterference result also has a different formulation to ours; it states that the behavior of well-typed processes is invariant, relative to may testing, under certain value-substitutions. Intuitively, it means that the encryption/decryption primitives preserve values of type Secret from certain kinds of attackers. It would be interesting to add these primitives to the our security π-calculus and to try to adapt the associated type rules to the set of I-Types.
